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Putting the Cart Back Behind the Horse: The Future of




As the world becomes increasingly globalized, and as the global re-
cession that began in 2008 continues to wreak havoc on the economy
at large (and the employment market in particular), U.S.-based corpo-
rations can ill afford to squander needed financial resources on need-
less litigation.1 Although many factors will contribute to a complete
economic recovery, a robust U.S. economy depends in part on the suc-
cess of major U.S.-based corporations and their ability to propel trad-
ing activity, employment, and economic growth.
In recent years, plaintiffs have increasingly turned to the Alien Tort
Statute2 ("ATS") as a means to seek redress in U.S. courts for griev-
ances stemming from actions occurring abroad. As the volume of
ATS litigation has grown, so too have the theories of liability and pos-
sible range of defendants plaintiffs are pursuing under the statute.
One such expansion has been the naming of corporations as defend-
ants in ATS suits, which first occurred in the Second Circuit in 1997. 3
Although defending against litigation is a fact of life for multinational
corporations based in the U.S., the ad hoc development of new theo-
ries of liability and new causes of action under the ATS has been un-
warranted, costly, and has led to a great deal of uncertainty. The
purpose of this article is to illustrate the expanded ways in which cor-
porations have been subjected to liability under the ATS in the Sec-
ond Circuit, which, at least presently, ended with the Second Circuit's
decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.4
* J.D., DePaul University College of Law, anticipated May 2011; B.A., English, University of
Iowa, 2004.
1. See Sudeep Reddy, Grim Milestone as Jobless Rate Tops 10%, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2009, at
Al.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The Alien Tort Statute provides as follows: "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in viola-
tion of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
3. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
4. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
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In holding that the ATS does not subject corporations to the juris-
diction of U.S. courts,5 a three judge panel of the Second Circuit has
made a move in the right direction in quelling the continued judicial
expansion of the ATS. Although the Second Circuit's decision was
reached after a thorough analysis of international law, there are signif-
icant domestic policy interests at stake as well. For too long, courts
have "put the cart before the horse" when it comes to ATS suits, mak-
ing assumptions about who can be liable and the possible theories
under which parties can be liable without considering the legal basis
for their assumptions or the consequences of new and expanded forms
of liability.6 ATS precedent encourages courts to consider these inter-
ests, and reveals that courts should be wary of expanding the potential
bases of ATS liability in the absence of a congressional directive to do
SO. 7
Section II of this article will discuss the background and develop-
ment of the modern line of ATS cases in the Second Circuit which led
up to the court's holding in Kiobel, and will provide an overview of
the statute and the way courts have interpreted it for readers unfamil-
iar with ATS jurisprudence.8 Section III will discuss the Second Cir-
cuit's opinion in the Kiobel case. 9 Section IV of this article will
analyze the Second Circuit's Kiobel decision in light of the policy rea-
sons that exist for distinguishing between corporations and individuals
and will argue that courts should exhibit restraint when deciding fu-
ture ATS cases in light of the lack of mandate the judiciary has for
creating new causes of action.10
II. BACKGROUND
The ATS simply provides that "[t]he district courts shall have origi-
nal jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, commit-
5. Id. at 145.
6. See, e.g., Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008). In Romero,
the Eleventh Circuit held that the ATS "grants jurisdiction from complaints of torture against
corporate defendants." The court included no analysis of this issue and cited Aldana v. Del
Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2005), for the proposition that the
ATS grants jurisdiction over corporate defendants. Aldana, however, assumed that corporate
defendants are subject to jurisdiction under the ATS without analyzing the issue. Id. In the
Second Circuit, the issue was acknowledged prior to Kiobel, but never directly addressed. See,
e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 261 (2d Cir. 2009)
(assuming, without deciding, that corporations can be liable for violations of customary law,
which, in turn, means that corporations can be liable under the ATS).
7. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725-29 (2004).
8. See infra Section II.
9. See infra Section III.
10. See infra Section IV.
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ted in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.""u Enacted by the First Congress as part of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, the ATS was seldom used by plaintiffs until 1980, the year in
which the Second Circuit decided Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.12 In Filar-
tiga, the plaintiffs, Paraguayan citizens living in the U.S., brought a
wrongful death action under the ATS against the defendant, a former
Paraguayan Inspector General of Police, who was also then living in
the U.S.13 The plaintiffs were the father and sister of a man killed in
Paraguay while in the custody of the defendant. 14 The plaintiffs al-
leged that the decedent was killed in response to the political activities
of one of the plaintiffs, the decedent's father.15 The Second Circuit
held that "an act of torture committed by a state official against one
held in detention violates established norms of the international law
of human rights, and hence, the law of nations. 1 6 Thus, the court had
jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the ATS.17 Despite the decep-
tively simple language of the ATS, Filartiga was merely the beginning
of a long line of cases in the Second Circuit exploring the scope and
contours of the ATS.1 8
After the Filartiga decision, U.S. federal courts presiding over law-
suits predicated on this vague and largely unexplored statute ex-
amined the issue of whether the ATS was intended solely to confer
jurisdiction to federal courts for tort claims brought by aliens, or
whether the statute also created a cause of action for various torts
committed "in violation of the law of nations."1 9 This issue was of
critical importance: if the ATS is solely jurisdictional, legislation
would be required to create a cause of action under the ATS, making
the statute of little utility absent the congressional creation of actiona-
ble offenses. In its only decision involving the ATS, the U.S. Supreme
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
12. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
13. Id. at 878.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 879.
16. Id. at 880.
17. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889.
18. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir.
2007); Viet. Assoc. Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chemical Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008);
Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The issue was first addressed in 1984 in a concurring opinion
written by Judge Bork of the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. He argued that the ATS
merely confers jurisdiction and that a cause or causes of action would need to be created legisla-
tively. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801-08 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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Court took the opportunity to clarify the matter for lower federal
courts going forward in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.20
A. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
The Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain finally
settled the question of whether the ATS creates a cause of action or
whether it is simply a jurisdictional statute which provides jurisdiction
in U.S. federal courts.21 In Sosa, the plaintiff, a Mexican citizen, was
indicted by a U.S. federal grand jury for the torture and murder of a
Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") agent.22 The plaintiff alleged
that he was kidnapped in Mexico and transported to the U.S. at the
behest of DEA agents in order to stand for trial. 23 Following an ac-
quittal in his criminal trial, the plaintiff filed a tort suit in a U.S. dis-
trict court against a Mexican national who participated in the
kidnapping, claiming that the abduction constituted a violation of the
law of nations under the ATS.24
Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the ATS is a jurisdic-
tional statute, but that the "jurisdictional grant is best read as having
been enacted on the understanding that the common law would pro-
vide a cause of action for the modest number of international law vio-
lations with a potential for personal liability at the time" the statute
was enacted. 25 The Court stated that, historically, those actions were
(1) offenses against ambassadors, (2) violations against safe conduct,
and (3) "individual actions arising out of prize captures and piracy. '2 6
Pursuant to the Sosa decision, federal courts are allowed to recognize
additional causes of action but "should not recognize private claims
under federal common law for violations of any international norm
with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than
the historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was enacted. '2 7 In
essence, this means that a court may not exercise jurisdiction over a
claim unless the tort is as well-defined as the torts that constituted
violations of the law of nations in 1789. After consulting various
20. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
21. Id. at 694.
22. Id. at 697.
23. Id. at 698.
24. Id. The plaintiff also sued the United States government under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The Supreme Court held that the Federal Tort Claims Act's "for-
eign country exception bars all claims based on any injury suffered in a foreign country, regard-
less of where the tortious act or omission occurred." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712.
25. Id. at 724.
26. Id. at 720.
27. Id. at 732.
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sources of international law, the court concluded that the plaintiff's
claim of arbitrary detainment failed due to the fact that there was no
sufficiently specific binding rule of international law prohibiting this
conduct. 28 Significantly, the Court commanded lower federal courts
to exercise judgment as to the practical consequences of making a
cause of action available to litigants in U.S. federal courts.29 Thus,
even if a tort claim is as well-defined and definite as the torts consid-
ered to be violations of the law of nations in 1789, courts should not
exercise jurisdiction if the practical consequences of doing so would
be too great.
The Supreme Court put forth a number of reasons why courts
should exercise restraint in allowing new causes of action to proceed
under the ATS.30 The Court discussed the change in conception of the
federal common law31 and the Court's decision in Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins,32 which ended the notion of a body of federal common law
and instructed courts to look to legislative guidance rather than exer-
cising judgment over innovations in the law.33 In addition, the Court
indicated that consideration should be given to the potential implica-
tions for U.S. foreign relations and foreign policy before extending the
ATS to encompass new causes of action.34 Finally, the Court acknowl-
edged that it had "no congressional mandate to seek out and define
new and debatable violations of the law of nations, and modern indi-
cations of congressional understanding of the judicial role in the field
have not affirmatively encouraged greater judicial creativity. '35
Justice Scalia concurred, writing for himself, Justice Thomas, and
Chief Justice Rehnquist. He agreed with the majority that the ATS is
a jurisdictional grant, but disagreed with the majority's position that
courts have the discretion to create causes of action under the ATS
based on international law.3 6 According to Justice Scalia, "creating a
28. Id. at 738.
29. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733.
30. Id. at 725-31.
31. Id. at 725. The Court stated when the ATS was enacted, "the accepted conception was of
the common law as 'a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory
within it unless and until changed by statute."' Id. (quoting Black and White Taxicab & Transfer
Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928)). The Court went on
to state that "[n]ow, however, in most cases where a court is asked to state or formulate a com-
mon law principle in a new context, there is a general understanding that the law is not so much
found or discovered as it is either made or created." Id.
32. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
33. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 726.
34. Id. at 727-28.
35. Id. at 728.
36. Id. at 739.
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federal command (federal common law) out of 'international norms,'
and then constructing a cause of action to enforce that command
through the purely jurisdictional grant of the ATS, is nonsense upon
stilts. 37
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa, however, federal courts
have found that the ATS provides a cause of action in increasingly
divergent circumstances. 38
B. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc.
Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. provides a useful illustration of the type of
analysis that is undertaken by courts faced with the question of
whether a particular claim constitutes a proper cause of action under
the ATS after the Supreme Court's Sosa39 decision. In Abdullahi, the
plaintiffs, who were Nigerian children and their guardians, alleged
that after an outbreak of bacterial meningitis in northern Nigeria, the
defendant, pharmaceutical manufacturer Pfizer, sent three American
doctors to work with a group of four Nigerian doctors to experiment
with the use of a new drug, Trovan.40 At the time, Trovan had not yet
been approved by the FDA. 4' The drug was given to children who
were patients at a hospital in Kano, Nigeria.42 The doctors, who were
employees of Pfizer, allegedly treated two hundred children who
sought treatment at the hospital.43 The plaintiffs alleged that half the
children were given Trovan, and the other half were given a drug
called Ceftriaxone, which had already been approved by the FDA.44
The plaintiffs alleged that the doctors purposely gave the children who
took Ceftriaxone a lower dose than necessary in order to make Trovan
look more effective in treating meningitis. 45
After two weeks, Pfizer allegedly left Nigeria without administering
further care.46 Eleven children died; five had taken Trovan and six
took the allegedly lowered dose of Ceftriaxone. 47 The plaintiffs al-
leged that Pfizer did not obtain the informed consent of the children
or their parents and did not disclose the risks associated with the ex-
37. Id. at 743.
38. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009); In re S. African Apartheid,
617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
39. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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perimental study, both of which were required under treatment proto-
col prior to treatment. 48
In reviewing the district court's dismissal of the case for failure to
state a claim under the ATS, the Second Circuit used a test previously
developed in that circuit to determine whether the allegations in the
plaintiffs' complaint, if true, established a violation of international
law which is actionable under the ATS. 49 Under that test, the court
"determine[d] whether the norm alleged (1) [was] a norm of interna-
tional character that States universally abide by, or accede to, out of a
sense of legal obligation, (2) [was] defined with a specificity compara-
ble to the 18th-century paradigms discussed in Sosa, and (3) [was] of
mutual concern to States. '50 The first step the court took in making
that determination was to look at Article 38 of the Statute of the In-
ternational Court of Justice, which identified where to find "compe-
tent proof of the content of customary international law."'51
The court looked to a number of sources of international law in
coming to the conclusion that the norm of international law prohibit-
ing non-consensual medical experimentation was "universally ac-
cept[ed] in the community of nations. '52 The court rested its decision
that there was broad acceptance of this norm of international law on
the quantity of sources and "a consistent pattern of action by national
law-making authorities. '53 The court then addressed the issue of
whether the norm of international law prohibiting non-consensual
medical experimentation contained the degree of specificity required
by Sosa, and quickly concluded that the required specificity was pre-
48. Id. at 170.
49. Id. at 174.
50. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 175.
51. Id. The U.S. is a party to the International Court of Justice Statute. These sources of
international law under the statute are:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules ex-
pressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) . . . judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1) (1945).
52. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 183-84. Among those sources were the London Agreement to the
International Military Tribunal, the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR"), the World Medical Association's Declaration of Helsinki, and U.S. domestic law.
Id. at 177-84.
53. Id. at 184.
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sent due to the volume of recognized sources of international law that
created the norm.54
The dissenting opinion of Judge Wesley highlights the murky waters
that courts often tread in when trying to determine whether an ATS
cause of action should be permitted to proceed under Sosa.55 Al-
though Judge Wesley agreed with the test the majority used for deter-
mining whether a cause of action may proceed under the ATS, he
disagreed that the first and third parts of the majority's test were satis-
fied.56 In concluding that the prohibition of non-consensual medical
experimentation is not universally abided by and that states are not
obligated to abide by it, the dissent examined the sources of interna-
tional law relied upon by the majority.57 In response to the majority's
reliance on the enactment of the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), the dissent quoted the Supreme
Court's Sosa opinion, which stated that the ICCPR is a "well-known
international agreement that despite its moral authority, has little util-
ity in defining international obligations. '5 8 The dissenting opinion
also noted that the ICCPR does not apply to private actors. 59 The
dissent noted that (1) the Convention on Human Rights and Bi-
omedicine relied on by the majority in its analysis was a regional con-
vention, (2) the largest and most influential nations in the region did
not ratify the Convention, and (3) the actions at issue in Abdullahi
took place a year before the Convention was promulgated. 60 A num-
ber of the sources of international law were promulgated after the
events at issue in the case, and those sources specifically stated that
they were "not significant or relevant for purposes of customary inter-
national law," and that they "express[ed] the sensibilities and the as-
serted aspirations and demands of some countries or organizations but
are not statements of universally-recognized legal obligations. '61
54. Id. Sosa requires courts to only recognize causes of action where the norm of interna-
tional law is "no less definite in content ... than the historical paradigms familiar when the ATS
was enacted." 542 U.S. at 732 (2004).
55. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
56. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 191-212 (Wesley, J., dissenting). The first part of the test requires
that it is a norm of international character that States universally abide by, or accede to, out of a
sense of legal obligation. The third part requires that the norm is of mutual concern to States.
Id.
57. Id. at 193-207.
58. Id. at 195 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004)).
59. Id.
60. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 195 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 196-97 (Wesley, J., dissenting). See Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine,
Apr. 4, 1997, E.T.S. No. 164.
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An important point of disagreement for the dissent was that the
majority only considered the underlying norm - the prohibition of
non-consensual medical testing - but did not consider the violator of
the norm.62 The dissent argued that the consideration should be
"whether customary international law prohibits private actors from
medical experimentation on non-consenting human subjects. '63 Ac-
cording to the dissent, it may well be that a norm of international law
meets the test with respect to state actors, but does not have the same
universal application with respect to private actors.64
As for the majority's conclusion that non-consensual medical exper-
imentation by private actors was an issue of mutual concern for the
states, the dissent argued that "in order for conduct to be of mutual
concern, it must 'threaten serious consequences in international af-
fairs."65 According to the dissent, the risks from medical experimen-
tation by private actors simply do not rise to the level required by
Sosa, because the potential consequences are not great enough.66 The
dissent pointed out that "murder of one private party by another, uni-
versally proscribed by the domestic law of all countries . . . is not ac-
tionable" under the ATS, "because the nations of the world have not
demonstrated that this wrong is of mutual, and not merely several,
concern. ' 67 As that is so, the dissent questioned how non-consensual
medical experimentation by one private party on another is a matter
of mutual concern.68 Noting that the Second Circuit has consistently
looked at whether a state has agreed to be bound by means of an
express international agreement as the best evidence as to whether a
norm is one of mutual concern, the dissent strongly disagreed with the
majority's view that treaties applicable to state action apply equally to
private action without some expression in the agreements themselves
stating that that is the case.69
Finally, the dissent argued that the downstream effects (in reference
to the majority's view that Pfizer's actions could encourage the spread
of disease because potential foreign plaintiffs might be leery of medi-
cal treatment from American corporations and thus go untreated) of
non-consensual medical experimentation do not convert the plaintiffs'
62. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 193.
63. Id. at 194 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004) (emphasis in
original)).
64. Id. at 203. This view is grounded in Sosa footnote 20.
65. Id. at 185 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004)).
66. Id. at 196-97 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
67. Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 207.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 208.
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claims into violations of the law of nations. 70 To illustrate this, the
dissent pointed out that under the majority's view, "[the analysis]
would be no different when evaluating the medical malpractice of Pfi-
zer's research physicians or the strict products liability for its allegedly
defective drug, but malpractice and products liability are among the
quintessential subjects of domestic law."'71
C. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.
Aside from finding jurisdiction under the ATS for an increasing va-
riety of claims, as illustrated by Abdullahi, federal courts have also
expanded upon the theories of liability available under a given cause
of action. 72 A prominent example of this is the Second Circuit's deci-
sion, announced in Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank, Ltd., to al-
low plaintiffs to plead claims of aiding and abetting liability against
defendants.73 In this type of case, a plaintiff may plead that a defen-
dant (such as a corporation) aided and abetted the actual violator of
customary international law. After holding that a defendant may be
liable for aiding and abetting in Khulumani,74 the Second Circuit ad-
dressed the proper standard for aiding and abetting liability in Presby-
terian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. 75
In Presbyterian Church, heard on the same day and by the same
Second Circuit panel as Kiobel,76 a unanimous panel enunciated the
aiding and abetting liability standard as well as the source of law that
dictates that standard.77 The case arose out of human rights abuses
alleged to have been committed by the Sudanese government against
the civilian population in southern Sudan.78 Specifically, the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant, a Canadian corporation engaged in oil ex-
traction in southern Sudan, aided and abetted the government in vio-
lating customary international law related to torture, war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity.79 The Second Circuit af-
firmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defen-
dant, holding that under the ATS, a court must look to international
law to determine the'proper standard for aiding and abetting liability,
70. Id.
71. Id. at 208 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
72. See, e.g., In re Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 536 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (J.P.M.L. 2008).
73. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007).
74. Id.
75. 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
76. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
77. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009).
78. Id. at 250-51.
79. Id. at 251.
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and that under international law, a plaintiff must "show that the de-
fendant provided substantial assistance with the purpose of facilitating
the alleged offenses. o80 The court concluded that the plaintiffs could
not prove that the defendant acted with the "purpose to assist the
Government's violations .... 81
The court relied heavily on Judge Katzmann's concurrence in
Khulumani,82 and looked to footnote 20 of Sosa to support the pro-
position that the scope of liability for a violation of international law
under the ATS should be found in international law.83 The court also
noted that looking to domestic law for the aiding and abetting liability
standard would "violate Sosa's command that we limit liability to 'vio-
lations of . . .international law ...with ...definite content and
acceptance among civilized nations equivalent to the historical para-
digms familiar when [the ATS] was enacted.'"84 The court then
looked to the Rome Statute of the International Court of Justice and
adopted its standard as the proper standard for aiding and abetting
liability.85 Under this standard, aiding and abetting liability exists
"when the defendant (1) provides practical assistance to the principal
which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime, and (2)
does so with the purpose of facilitating the commission of that
crime." 86
III. SUBJECT OPINION: KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM Co.
In Kiobel, a three judge panel of the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals examined a question, the answer to which had previously been
assumed but not decided in the Second Circuit: whether corporations
are subject to the jurisdiction provided to federal courts by the ATS. 87
Two judges agreed that corporations are not subject to the jurisdiction
provided by the ATS, while one judge ultimately concurred in the
judgment but strenuously disagreed with the majority's analysis. 88
This section discusses the facts surrounding the case and the Second
Circuit's decision.
80. Id. at 247 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 263.
82. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 268-77 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J.,
concurring).
83. Id. at 258.
84. Presbyterian Church, 582 F.3d at 259 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732
(2004)).
85. Id.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 117.
88. Id. at 114.
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A. Factual History
The facts of Kiobel are relatively straightforward. Beginning in
1958, the defendants, Royal Dutch Petroleum Company ("Royal
Dutch") and Shell Transport and Trading Company PLC ("Shell") op-
erated a subsidiary, Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nige-
ria, Ltd ("SPDC"), in the Ogoni Region of Nigeria.89 SPDC was
engaged in oil production and exploration. 90 A group of people in the
Ogoni Region formed a group called "Movement for Survival of
Ogoni People," which protested, among other things, the effects of oil
exploration on the environment of the region. 91 The plaintiffs, who
were residents of the Ogoni region, alleged that in 1993, the defend-
ants responded to the protestors by enlisting the Nigerian government
to combat the resistance of the Ogoni people.92 The Nigerian govern-
ment is alleged to have "shot and killed Ogoni residents and attacked
Ogoni villages - beating, raping, and arresting residents and destroy-
ing or looting property ... with the assistance of [the] defendants. 93
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants "(1) provided transportation
to Nigerian forces, (2) allowed their property to be utilized as a stag-
ing ground for attacks, (3) provided food for soldiers involved in the
attacks, and (4) provided compensation to those soldiers," and that by
aiding and abetting the Nigerian government in this way, the defend-
ants violated the law of nations under the ATS.94 The plaintiffs' spe-
cific claims were that the defendants aided and abetted "(1)
extrajudicial killing; (2) crimes against humanity; (3) torture or cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment; (4) arbitrary arrest and detention;
(5) violation of the rights to life, liberty, security, and association; (6)
forced exile; and (7) property destruction. '95
B. Procedural History
The plaintiffs filed a complaint in the District Court for the South-
ern District of New York in 2002 and amended their complaint in
89. Presbyterian Church, 582 F.3d at 123.
90. Id.
91. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123. In 1990, the Movement for Survival of Ogoni People presented
the Nigerian government with the Ogoni Bill of Rights, which called for political autonomy, the
right to control Ogoni affairs, the right to control and use Ogoni resources, adequate representa-
tion in political institutions, and the right to protect the Ogoni environment from degradation.
See Ogoni Bill of Rights (1990), available at http://www.mosop.org/Ogoni_Bill oLRights_1990.
pdf.
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2004.96 Holding that customary international law did not define the
plaintiffs' claims with the level of particularity required by Sosa, the
district court entered an order dismissing all of the plaintiffs' claims
except the claims for "aiding and abetting arbitrary arrest and deten-
tion; crimes against humanity; and torture or cruel, inhuman, and de-
grading treatment. ' 97 The district court then certified its order for
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 98
C. The Second Circuit's Opinion in Kiobel
The Second Circuit panel affirmed the portion of the district court's
order dismissing the claims against the defendants and reversed the
order to the extent that it allowed the plaintiffs' claims to proceed.99
Noting that the Second Circuit had "never directly addressed whether
[its] jurisdiction under the ATS extends to civil actions against corpo-
rations," the court framed the issue as involving a two step analysis.100
The first step required the court to determine whether international
law or domestic law governs the question. 101 In finding that interna-
tional law governs, the court looked to various sources of interna-
tional law and concluded that "the subjects of international law are
determined by international law."' 102 The court then looked to Sosa
and Circuit precedent to determine "whether international law ex-
tends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the per-
petrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a
corporation or individual.' 03 The question of whether the scope of
liability extends to the party being sued is significant because previous
96. Id. at 124.
97. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 124.
98. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006) provides as follows:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling ques-
tion of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which
would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion,
permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten
days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application for an appeal
hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the
Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
99. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 149.
100. Id. at 124.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 126. Among the sources of international law relied upon were the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, and Oppenheim's International Law.
103. Id. at 127 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004)) (emphasis
added).
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cases in the Second Circuit reached different results based on whether
an alleged perpetrator was a state official or private actor. 1 4 Ulti-
mately, the court found that under Sosa, it must look to customary
international law to "determine both whether certain conduct leads to
ATS liability and whether the scope of liability under the ATS extends
to the defendant being sued.' 0 5 Noting that it had looked to interna-
tional law to determine whether state officials, 10 6 private individu-
als,10 7 and aiders and abettors10 8 can be liable under the ATS, the
court concluded that it must also look to international law to deter-
mine whether corporations can be liable for international law viola-
tions under the ATS. 10 9
The second step of the Second Circuit's analysis required the court
to determine whether corporate liability is a norm of customary inter-
national law. 110 The court cited Sosa for the proposition that a norm
must be "specific, universal, and obligatory" to "attain the status of a
rule of customary international law.""' After indicating the sources
of international law Sosa requires courts to review," 2 the court ana-
lyzed each source and concluded that "imposing liability on corpora-
tions for violations of customary international law has not attained a
discernible, much less universal, acceptance among the nations of the
world in their relations inter se.""13
In presenting its holding, and in response to the concurring opinion,
the majority was careful to point out what it had not decided, noting
that "[n]othing in this opinion limits or forecloses suits under the ATS
104. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,239-41 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that private actors
can be liable for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, whereas state actors can
liable for a broader range of offenses).
105. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128 (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 130 (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980)).
107. Id. (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-41 (2d Cir. 1980)).
108. Id. (citing Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258-59
(2d Cir. 2009)).
109. Id.
110. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 131.
111. Id. (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004)).
112. Id. See Sosa, 542 U.S. 692, 733-34 (2004), which states:
Where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial deci-
sion, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence
of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and
experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which
they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of
their authors concerning with the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what
the law really is.
(citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
113. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 132-45. Pursuant to Circuit precedent, the court relied upon interna-
tional tribunals, international treaties, and works of "publicists" (meaning scholars and jurists).
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against a corporation's employees, managers, officers, directors, or
any other person who commits, or purposefully aids and abets, viola-
tions of international law.' 1 4 The opinion also emphasized the fact
that the holding applies only to corporate liability under the ATS; it
has nothing to do with corporate liability under other bodies of law,
including U.S. domestic law.115
D. Judge Leval's Concurrence
Although Judge Leval ultimately concurred in the judgment, the
concurring opinion evinces a fundamental disagreement with the ma-
jority as to whether corporations are subject to the jurisdiction of U.S.
federal courts under the ATS.116 Despite agreement that "interna-
tional law does not of its own force impose liability on corpora-
tions,"' 1 7 under the rationale of the concurrence, this is, for all
practical purposes, irrelevant. 118 The concurring opinion focused on
the absence of precedent for the rule adopted by the majority, stating
that "[n]o authoritative source document of international law adopts
or in any way approves the majority's view" that corporations are not
subject to federal court jurisdiction under the ATS.119 Under the view
of the concurrence, lack of support for corporate liability in interna-
tional law is not important, because the proper source material is do-
mestic, rather than international, law.120 This is the case because
Judge Leval views the question of whether corporations can be liable
merely as an issue of remedy. 121
IV. ANALYSIS
In Kiobel, the Second Circuit correctly held that, because interna-
tional law is the proper source for determining the scope of liability
for violations of international law norms and corporate liability is not
a norm of international law, corporations are not subject to the juris-
diction of U.S. courts under the ATS.122 However, in light of the con-
tinuing ability of courts to hold individuals liable under the ATS, there
114. Id. at 149.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 149-96 (Leval, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 186.
118. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 174 (Leval, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 160.
120. Id. at 175.
121. Id. at 176 ("International law leaves the manner of remedy to the independent determi-
nation of each State.").
122. Id. at 145. Of course, the decision does not affect suits brought against corporations
under other statutes.
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are policy reasons, largely unacknowledged by the court, that lend
support for distinguishing between corporations and individuals.
Courts outside the Second Circuit will inevitably be called upon to
determine whether corporations are subject to the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts under the ATS in light of the Kiobel holding. In addressing this
issue, courts should be mindful of the Supreme Court's admonishment
in Sosa that "judicial caution" must be exercised, 123 and consider the
features that distinguish individual liability from corporate liability.
Providing jurisdiction in U.S. courts for ATS suits against corpora-
tions has a negative impact not only on corporations and their share-
holders, but also on American taxpayers and international trade. In
addition, providing jurisdiction under the ATS for suits against corpo-
rations clogs federal dockets by inviting lawsuits with questionable le-
gal merit: as the permissible bases for litigation expand, plaintiffs will
become less constrained by the pleading requirements of Rule
11(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 124 Finally, the fail-
ure to exercise judicial restraint under the ATS poses problems for
U.S. foreign relations. Rather than focusing on the possible ramifica-
tions of not expanding the reach of the ATS in a given case, courts
must follow the command of the Supreme Court and view the conse-
quences of expanding the scope of liability under the ATS as a limita-
tion upon further expansion.
A. Sosa's "Practical Consequences"
In deciding Kiobel,125 the Second Circuit mentioned Sosa's directive
that courts must give weight to the "practical consequences of making
[an ATS] cause [of action] available to litigants in the federal courts,"
but the Second Circuit did little more than mention this require-
ment. 126 Under the court's analysis, the question of whether corpora-
tions are subject to jurisdiction under the ATS carries equal weight as
the question of whether to recognize a new cause of action under the
123. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
124. Rule 11(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or
other paper-whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it-an attorney
or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, informa-
tion, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by
a non frivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for estab-
lishing new law.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (emphasis added).
125. Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
126. Id. at 125 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 722-23 (2004)).
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ATS. 127 The Supreme Court's admonishment in Sosa that courts con-
sider the "practical consequences" of making a cause of action availa-
ble has been interpreted by lower courts to mean that courts should
consider the practical consequences that the decision will have on
courts and on U.S. foreign policy. 128 Be that as it may, subjecting cor-
porations to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts under the ATS has many
far-ranging consequences outside of the courthouse doors. Under
Sosa, courts have the implicit, if not explicit, authority to use discre-
tion when faced with the question of whether to further expand the
reach of the ATS.
Despite the fact that lower courts have interpreted the "practical
consequences" language to refer to the practical consequences that
the decision to allow a cause of action will have on courts, some courts
have seemingly looked at the alleged conduct of the defendant and
then determined whether the practical consequences of not allowing
the cause of action to proceed favor permitting the action. 129  Of
course, one could argue that the potential benefits of allowing an ATS
action to proceed are in fact a consequence and that it is proper to
consider these benefits under Sosa. But it is clear from the language
of Sosa that the "practical consequences" consideration is a limitation
on allowing new causes of action. 130
One practical consequence of allowing new causes of actions or the-
ories of liability under the ATS can occur when courts focus on the
specific allegations in the case rather than the norm of international
law that is implicated. Once a court reviews a source of international
law to determine if specific conduct violates the law of nations for
127. Id. at 128 (quoting Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 582 F.3d 244 (2d
Cir. 2009)). "[R]ecognition of secondary liability is no less significant a decision than whether to
recognize a whole new tort in the first place."
128. See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 182-83 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing the impact
allowing the litigation to proceed would have on U.S. diplomatic and national security interests);
De Los Santos Mora v. N.Y., 524 F.3d 183, 209 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting the impracticalities of
making the failure to notify a criminal defendant of his right to contact his country's consul a
violation of the law of nations); Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767, 782 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that
allowing a claim of parental child abduction to be considered a cause of action under the ATS
would turn federal courts into "ill-suited family courts").
129. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163,186 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that the admin-
istration of drug trials without informed consent poses a threat to international peace and secur-
ity and that the "failure to secure consent for human experimentation has the potential to
generate substantial anti-American animus and hostility.").
130. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004). Footnote 21 follows the
"practical consequences" directive. Footnote 21 begins by stating: "This requirement of clear
definition is not meant to be the only principle limiting the availability of relief in the federal
courts for violations of customary international law .... " (emphasis added). The second para-
graph of Footnote 21 states: "Another possible limitation that we need not apply here is a policy
of case-specific deference to the political branches .... " (emphasis added).
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ATS purposes, the specific factual allegations in the case lose their
long-term importance. If a future defendant's conduct is entirely less
serious but the same or an equivalent source of law is implicated, the
future defendant may pay the price for a previous court's zeal to pun-
ish a previous wrongdoer's reprehensible conduct. Thus, in undertak-
ing an examination of the practical consequences of making an action
available, it is important that courts focus on the specificity of the
norm of international law rather than the reprehensibility of the de-
fendant's conduct.
B. Ending Corporate Liability Does Not End All Liability
At first blush, the holding in Kiobel may seem disturbing in that it
could allow corporations to directly violate human rights around the
globe without fear of liability under the ATS. Indeed, the concurring
opinion in Kiobel discusses this possibility at length.131 But, as the
majority noted, "[c]orporate liability imposes responsibility for the ac-
tions of a culpable individual on a wholly new defendant - the corpo-
ration." 132 While corporations cannot be liable under Kiobel, the
individuals working for a corporation, whether directors, officers, or
employees, will continue to be held liable. 133 The possibility of per-
sonal liability for violations of international law under the ATS pro-
vides a strong incentive for corporate decision-makers and employees
to conform their conduct to that which is permitted by international
law. A corporate executive will likely be exposed to much greater
financial risk in the face of personal liability than the executive would
face as a result of corporate losses stemming from ATS litigation. At
the same time, a regime of corporate liability puts the risk of loss on
corporate shareholders who typically have very little knowledge, and
thus little culpability, for the actions of persons acting on behalf of the
corporation.
C. The Impact of Corporate Liability Under the A TS
In determining whether corporations should be subject to jurisdic-
tion under the ATS, courts should take notice of the grounds that exist
for distinguishing between individuals and corporations, and be mind-
ful of the implications the decision will have on domestic corporations,
their shareholders, the U.S. economy, and the developing world. This
does not mean that plaintiffs should be left without the remedy the
131. See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 155-57 (Leval, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
133. See id. at 149.
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ATS provides if an actionable tort under the ATS is committed. In-
stead, plaintiffs should look to individuals - those immediately re-
sponsible for such acts - rather than to corporations, where the cost
will often be spread to those with no knowledge of or responsibility
for corporations' actions.
1. Litigation Expense
One implication of permitting corporate liability under the ATS is
the costs involved with ATS suits. Of course, a necessary component
of operating a large multinational corporation is the necessity of ex-
pending resources on litigation. Unlike many other corporate ex-
penditures, defensive litigation, used here to mean litigation where the
corporation is forced to expend resources defending a suit, does not
typically add value to the corporation. Theoretically, every dollar
spent defending a suit is a dollar not included in a corporation's an-
nual profits. One recent study found that, in 2006, total combined
profits for all Fortune 500 companies equaled $610 billion.134 Those
same companies spent a total of $210 billion on litigation expenses. 135
In that same year, compensation for Fortune 500 CEOs was a com-
bined total of $7.5 billion. 136 This means that corporations expended
more than one third of the dollar amount of total profits and twenty-
eight times more than CEO compensation on litigation expenses. 13
7
Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to know exactly how much of
each corporation's litigation budget was expended on ATS litigation,
plaintiffs in ATS cases typically claim and have been awarded substan-
tial damages. 138 In addition, the uncertainty surrounding issues such
as the development of new causes of action and theories of liability,
such as aiding and abetting liability, will inevitably result in breeding
more litigation to test the parameters of the ATS in district courts
across the country.
The cost of litigation, and the costs of settlements or judgments that
result from ATS suits, are ultimately borne by the shareholders of cor-
134. John B. Henry, Fortune 500: The Total Cost Of Litigation Estimated at 1/3 Profits, availa-
ble at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.comlcurrent.php?artType=view&artMonth=September&art




138. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163,169 (2d Cir. 2009); In re S. African Apartheid
Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Plaintiffs alleged damages totaling more than $400
billion). See Isabel Ordonez & Russell Gold, Shell Settles Nigeria Case - Oil Giant to Pay $15.5
Million Over Deaths of Activists, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2009, at B2 (discussing an ATS claim
settled by corporate defendants for $15.5 million despite the corporation's refusal to admit
liability).
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porations. Of course, corporations are generally subject to civil liabil-
ity under U.S. law, and this is not, nor should it be, controversial. The
difference in ATS cases is the Supreme Court's directive that lower
courts approach the expansion of the ATS with caution, and the fact
that courts have "no congressional mandate to seek out and define
new and debatable violations of the law of nations. ' 139 Where no
other possibility of recovering damages exists, the combination of
deep corporate pockets and the ability to bring suit in U.S. courts
surely makes corporations attractive defendants, and can result in cor-
porate shareholders absorbing the costs of wrongs that were perpe-
trated by foreign states. A regime of ATS corporate liability allows
the costs of redressing the wrongs of foreign governments to be
shifted too easily to the shareholders of U.S. corporations.
2. Loss of Productivity
The combination of substantial litigation costs and significant uncer-
tainty for U.S. corporations considering investment or operations
outside the U.S. will lead to reduced productivity by those corpora-
tions. Any time a corporation considers whether to expand opera-
tions to a location outside the U.S., it must undertake an examination
of the risks involved in doing so. The possibility of being subject to
jurisdiction, combined with the expansion of causes of action 140 and
theories of liability141 under the ATS, will force corporations to un-
dergo an analysis of the ATS litigation risk that could come from that
investment. 142 Although the law of the Second Circuit after Presbyte-
rian Church requires plaintiffs to show that a defendant acted with the
purpose of aiding and abetting a violation of the law of nations, 143
there is no clear national standard at this point in time. While it is a
good thing for corporations to evaluate their actions and to act
responsibly and ethically, the ad hoc development of new causes of
action and theories of liability make it impossible to determine exactly
what will be considered a violation of the law of nations. It seems
impossible for corporations to know that a state is violating the law of
nations if the law of nations remains undefined, amorphous, and sub-
ject to further judicial expansion. The uncertainty of whether an in-
vestment will lead to substantial future ATS liability may force a
corporation to decide to either: (a) refrain from entering the transac-
139. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004)
140. See, e.g., Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 169.
141. See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007).
142. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
143. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2009).
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tion out of concern that a party to the transaction has previously or is
currently violating the law of nations based on existing case law, or (b)
conclude that, given the uncertainty attendant to ATS litigation, it is
too risky to enter the transaction because it is foreseeable that the
ATS may be interpreted in the future to apply to some conduct in
question. This outcome is certainly negative in terms of promoting
economic efficiency, because a corporation may decline to invest in a
location it otherwise would have out of fear that it could face costly
and embarrassing litigation. 144
3. Unintended Economic Consequences in the Third World
On the surface, subjecting corporations to the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts looks like a positive step for human rights. But it is not neces-
sarily the case that isolating states with poor human rights records
from foreign investment will be a positive step for human rights on the
whole. A regime of corporate ATS liability discourages corporations
from operating in locales where corporate activity could have the
most substantial positive impact. Many of the world's infamous
human rights abusing states are economically isolated from the global
economy.145 Organizations such as the International Monetary Fund
and World Bank promote economic development in the poorest coun-
tries (which often have poor human rights records), in order to help
these nations enter the global economy.146 Creating disincentives for
corporations considering what may already be risky investments will
make it more difficult to bring states led by abusive and oppressive
regimes into the fold of the global economy. It is perverse to staunch
the flow of capital into the poorest of countries in the name of human
rights, but this is exactly the sort of disincentive created by courts that
144. A newspaper article reporting on the filing of a lawsuit will not likely provide much
detail on the ATS or the way the Supreme Court has interpreted it. Bad publicity is generated
the moment a corporate defendant is alleged to have been involved with human rights abuses,
even though it may be that a foreign state actually committed the abuses and the corporation is
far removed from the actual abuses. In addition, press coverage will initially be generated by the
pleadings, not by findings of fact.
145. See, e.g., Celia W. Dugger, In Zimbabwe Power-Sharing Talks, Who Will Get the Real
Power?, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2008, at A6 (discussing the economic isolation of Zimbabwe's
oppressive president, Robert Mugabe).
146. "[The World Bank] provides low-interest loans, interest-free credits and grants to devel-
oping countries for a wide array of purposes that include investments in education, health, public
administration, infrastructure, financial and private sector development, agriculture, and envi-
ronmental and natural resource management." World Bank, http://web.worldbank.org/WB-
SITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,pagePK:50004410-piPK:36602-theSitePK:29708,00.
html (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
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have engaged in the unprincipled expansion of bases of corporate lia-
bility under the ATS.
4. Settlement Pressures
Another important practical consequence of corporate liability
under the ATS is the competing interests corporations face when de-
ciding how to proceed with litigation once an ATS suit has been filed.
In order to succeed on an ATS claim, a plaintiff must plead that there
has been a violation of the law of nations, and under the Supreme
Court's decision is Sosa, this necessarily means that a plaintiff must
allege that a corporate defendant has done something which is univer-
sally condemned. 147 This creates a strong incentive, if not a require-
ment, for plaintiffs to allege that a corporate defendant has committed
the most egregious and heinous acts imaginable in order to survive a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Once a plaintiff has
survived a motion to dismiss, the corporation is left facing grave accu-
sations, whether or not the plaintiff will ultimately be able to prove his
or her case. Obviously, the publicity generated by such accusations is
not good for any corporation. This leaves the corporation with two
options: settle the claim, regardless of whether such conduct has actu-
ally occurred, or proceed with litigation and continue enduring the
negative publicity. From a public relations standpoint, settling a claim
has the likelihood of creating the impression that the defendant is in
fact culpable and is settling to avoid the probable outcome of a trial.
On the other hand, failing to settle a claim and going to trial will in-
crease the duration of negative publicity.
D. The Broader Economic Consequences of A TS Expansions
In re South African Apartheid Litigation, a case decided by the
Southern District of New York in 2009, provides an example of some
of the larger problems created by corporate liability under the ATS. 148
In that case, which involved claims by South African residents that
several large U.S. corporations aided and abetted South Africa's
apartheid government, both the current South African government
and the George W. Bush administration suggested that allowing the
case to move forward could seriously compromise relations between
the U.S. and South Africa. 149 Despite the aforementioned considera-
147. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
148. In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
149. The United States filed a statement of interest with the Southern District of New York in
2003, stating that "continued adjudication of these suits risks potentially serious adverse conse-
quences for significant interests of the United States." The South African government also filed
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tions, which, given the Supreme Court's Sosa'50 admonishment to
consider the potential implications for U.S. foreign relations and for-
eign policy before extending the ATS to encompass new causes of ac-
tion should have resulted in dismissal of the claims, there were also
implications for the U.S. economy. 151
Among firms receiving financial bailouts from the Federal Govern-
ment in 2008, General Motors ("GM"), one of the defendants in In re
South African Apartheid Litigation, was among the largest recipients,
with estimates of total federal funds received at approximately $49.9
billion.152 Obviously, all federal funds expended have at a minimum
an indirect impact on the American public. When a corporation takes
funding from the federal government, the federal deficit increases and
Congress' ability to fund other programs is, at least in theory, dimin-
ished. To some extent then, the burden of apartheid-related litigation,
from which the South African government is statutorily immune,153
has now fallen on the American public through GM's alleged aiding
and abetting of the South African apartheid government. It seems
implausible, especially given the input of the Bush administration and
the South African government, that either the Second Circuit or the
District Court for the Southern District of New York were approach-
ing the case with the judicial caution required by Sosa."'1 54 Surely, if
the source or content of customary international law is as unclear as
would appear from the differing viewpoints of the judges involved in
deciding the case, a thoughtful consideration of the impacts of such
litigation would tilt the balance squarely in favor of dismissal. Fur-
thermore, considering that the Canadian and German governments
a statement with the district court: "In the South African government's view, the issues raised in
these proceedings are essentially political in nature. They should be and are being resolved
through South Africa's own democratic processes .... " Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Appellees, In re S. African Apartheid Litig. (No. 09-2778-cv).
150. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728.
151. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2009)
152. CNNMoney.com, http://money.cnn.com/news/storysupplement/economy/bailouttracker/
index.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2010).
153. See Anthony Lewis, At Home Abroad; Truth and Healing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1995, at
A17 for a description of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Committee, which grants civil
and criminal immunity to officials of the apartheid government in exchange for testimony about
the acts they committed.
154. Sosa, 542 U.S. 692, 722-23 (2004). After the election of President Jacob Zuma in May
2009, the South African government changed course on its view of In re South African Apartheid
Litigation, now favoring ATS litigation against U.S. corporate defendants. David Glovin &
Mike Cohen, South Africa Backs GM, Ford, IBM Apartheid Lawsuit, BLOOMBERG, Sep. 3, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601116&sid=a2xm-iMWNc7g.
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both contributed to the bailout of GM,155 the decision to allow the
litigation to continue has an indirect financial impact in both of those
countries as well. Concededly, the decision as to whether to entertain
jurisdiction in a non-ATS case does not typically involve consideration
as to the financial impact to the defendant or third parties. These
types of considerations, however, are exactly the type that courts are
instructed to take into account given the Supreme Court's decision in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.156
For an example of the extent to which a suit such as In re South
African Apartheid Litigation has consequences on U.S. citizens, one
need look no further than the Supreme Court's inability to muster a
quorum to vote on the defendant's petition for certiorari to the
Court.157 Although Supreme Court Justices do not typically provide
reasons for recusal, three Justices held stock in at least one defendant
company. 158 One Justice's son works for one of the defendant compa-
nies.' 59 Through the use of retirement investment plans such as the
401k and the IRA, a large segment of the U.S. population has a finan-
cial interest in the profitability of U.S. corporations. It is simply unfair
to punish the shareholders of the defendant corporations and the cor-
porations themselves by transferring the liability for the atrocities of
apartheid to them and away from the South African government
through the use of the ATS.
In addition to what could be called the "direct" effects of corporate
liability under the ATS, the possibility for foreign backlash against
U.S. corporations is another factor that should be considered by
courts deciding ATS cases. Clearly, under the ATS, district courts
have jurisdiction over suits by aliens for violations of the law of na-
tions. 160 Nothing in the language or the history of the statute would
indicate that corporations domiciled outside of the U.S. are immune
to ATS suits. 161 The notable difference, however, is whether a federal
court has personal jurisdiction over a given foreign corporation. It is
in this way that U.S.-based corporations are disproportionately disad-
155. See, e.g., Paul Ingrassia, How GM Lost Its Way, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2009, at A21 (noting
that with the inclusion of funds received by the Canadian and German governments, the total
received by GM approached $100 billion).
156. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733.
157. Jess Bravin & Mark H. Anderson, Justices Lack Quorum on Apartheid Suit, WALL ST. J.,
May 13, 2008, at A3 (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Breyer hold stock in defen-




160. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
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vantaged. A foreign state soliciting business with out-of-state corpo-
rations may therefore have an incentive to avoid doing business with
U.S.-based corporations. If business is transacted with a U.S. corpora-
tion, the financial incentive for plaintiffs to bring ATS litigation in-
creases the likelihood that the foreign state, like the corporation, will
be judged for its actions in U.S. federal courts.
E. The Future of Kiobel
Following the Second Circuit's decision in Kiobel, the Kiobel plain-
tiffs filed a Motion for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc in the Sec-
ond Circuit. Both of those motions have been denied.162 However,
the importance of the decision outside the Second Circuit is already
becoming clear, and it seems likely that Supreme Court review will
ultimately be sought. In a September 30, 2010, decision, the District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana (which sits in the Seventh
Circuit) discussed and approved of Kiobel's holding, although the
plaintiffs' claims were dismissed on other grounds. 163 The Kiobel de-
cision has also created a circuit split with the Eleventh Circuit, which
stated in Romero v. Drummond Co., that "[t]he text of the Alien Tort
Statute provides no express exception for corporations.., and the law
of this Circuit is that [the ATS] grants jurisdiction from complaints of
torture against corporate defendants." 164 Thus, there is reason to
think that the Supreme Court may grant certiorari and hear the case.
V. CONCLUSION
There are a number of possible solutions to the problems posed by
the current state of uncertainty regarding ATS litigation. The diffi-
culty in solving the problem has much to do with the fact that Con-
gress has remained silent on the issue. Clearly, the most effective
solution would be for Congress to amend the ATS by setting clear
parameters as to what constitutes a violation of the law of nations, the
parties that can be liable for violating the law of nations, and the
scope of liability for violations of the law of nations. This would re-
move much of the uncertainty corporations face when doing business
with foreign governments and when operating in foreign countries.
Amending the ATS would also allow Congress to "shut the door" to
162. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), reh'g en banc denied,
No. 06-4800-cv, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 27003, at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010), reh'g denied, No. 06-
4800-cv, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 2200, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 4, 2011).
163. Viera v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 1:09-cv-0495-RLY-DML, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103761, at
*6-7 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 30, 2010).
164. Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008).
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expanding the bases of ATS liability by enumerating the specific of-
fenses that would be actionable under the ATS. Whatever the end
result of a Congressional amendment to the ATS might be, such an
amendment would provide a degree of stability and certainty which
would give corporations a clear picture of the risk of ATS litigation in
their operations. It seems likely that corporations will exert increasing
resources lobbying for such an amendment as long as uncertainty
remains.
Another possibility is that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari
in a future ATS case, potentially in the Kiobel case, and will take the
opportunity to clarify its 2004 Sosa holding.165 If such a case should
arise, the Court should, at a minimum, give a clear statement as to the
sources of law that should be relied upon in determining whether a
given activity violates the law of nations. It should clarify the degree
of international acceptance a source of law should have, set a standard
for accessorial liability, and address the question of corporate liability.
This would give corporations a better idea of the risks posed by con-
ducting business in countries with questionable human rights records.
A better solution would be for the Court to either look to the original
meaning of the ATS or to enumerate specific actions that are deemed
to violate the law of nations. The argument against the latter option is
that the law of nations is constantly developing and an enumeration of
the specific acts which violate it would freeze the decision in time.
True as that may be, that concern ought to give way to the uncertainty
that abounds under Sosa.166
165. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machian, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
166. Id.
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